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SENATE.

36TH CoNGREss, (

1st Session.

S

~REP. CoM.

l

No. 93.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.
FEBRUARY

28, 1860.-0rdered to be printed.

Mr. FooTE made the following

REPORT.
[To accompany BillS. 230.]

The Committee on Claims, to whom were referred the cases of Letitia
Humphreys and of Robert Harrison and other claimants, under the
treaty of 1819 with Spain, together with voluminous documents in
relation to said claims, have had the same under consideration, and,
after a careful and patient reexamination of the whole subject, have
reached the same conclusion at which this committee arrived the first
session of the last Congress, and adopt the report then made by this
committee through the honorable l\1r. Clarke, of New Hampshire, then
a member of the committee, as presenting a succinct and fair view of
the origin and nature of these claims, and which report is in the following words :

A.
The Committee on Claims, to whom were 'referred the reports of the
Court of Claims) in the cases of Letitia Humphreys) administratrix
of .Andrew .Atlcinson, deceased) and of Robert Harrison; and also
the memorial of the said Harrison to Congress, praying) in behalf of
himself and other claimants) the full and faithful execution of the 9th
article of the treaty of 1819 with Spain) by the payment of the residue
of the decrees made by the United States Judges in their favor) report:
That they have examined the facts and principles of law connected
with these cases, with the care and mature deliberation which the importance of the principles and the magnitude of the aggregate amount
involved seemed to require.
The cases referred belong to a class, all depending on the same
principles and considerations arising under the last clause of the ninth
article of the Florida treaty of 1819.
In order that the Senate may fully understand the decision of the
Court of Claims on the cases reported, and the merits of the class of
claims to which the cases referred belong, the committee deem it proper
to give a succinct statement of their nature and origin.
In 1811, relations of peace and amity existed between the United
States and Spain, under the treaty of 1795; but the relatjons between
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the United States and Great Britain, and between the latter power
and Spain, were of such a character as to create apprehensions on the
part of the United States that Great Britain would seize the provinces
of East and West Florida, then a dependency of the crown of Spain ;
and the United States having long looked to a cession of those provinces as an indemnity for her just claims upon Spain, and being unwilling, from their geographical position, that any other power should
possess them, and especially Great Britain, with whom we were then
on the eve of war, Cong:tess, on the 15th day of January, 1811, passed
an act and joint resolution, by the former of which the President was
authorized to take possession of the Floridas, ''in case any arrangement has been, or shall be, made with the local authority of said territory for delivering up the possession of the same, or any part thereof,
to the United States; or in the event of any attempt to occupy the
said territory, or any part thereof, by any foreign government.''
(3 Stats. at Large, pp. 471, 472.) And for that purpose, the President was authorized by that act to employ any part of the naval and
military forces of the United States; and $100,000 was appropriated
for that object.
General George Matthews and Colonel John McKee were appointed
military agents or commissioners of the United States, by the President, with secret instructions "to repair to that quarter with all
possible expedition,'' for the purpose of carrying out the intention
of the act of Congress, with authority, if necessary, to call to their
aid the naval and military forces of the United States in that quarter
of the Union, the commanders of which had been instructed to obey
their orders. (American State Papers, vol. 3, Foreign Relations,
p. 571.)
No surrender of that province was made by the governor, and the
agent of the United States proceeded to take possession of the whole
inhabited portion of East Florida, except the city of Saint Augustine,
including Amelia island and the neutral port of Fernandina; and this
possession, thus acquired, was forcibly maintained until about the
middle of May, 1813, when the United States troops were withdrawn
by command of General Pinckney.
As this occupation of East Florida by the American forces was
strenuously and forcibly resisted by the Spanish authorities thereof, a
feeling of great bitterness on the part of the invading forces was excited against the loyal Spanish inhabitants and officers; and an occupation of the province, which was only intended by Congress, in the
condition of things found to exist, to be peaceful" on the part of the
United States, and voluntary on the part of Spain, was converted into
a forcible occupation by the agent of the United States.
These injuries of 1812 and 1813, which were protested against by
Spain, were in open violation of the law of nations and of the treaty
of peace then existing between the two governments, and were so
admitted to be by the United States; and their commissioner, General
Matthews, was punished by dismission. (Am. State Papers, above
cited.)
During the war between the United States and Great Britain, in
1814, West Florida was entered by General Jackson and the army
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under his command, to expel the British and their Indian allies from
Pensacola; and in 1818, the same officer again entered West Florida,
in pursuit of the Indians, and St. Mark's and Pensacola were taken,
and subsequently restored.
.
Both these last-named invasions of General Jackson and his army
were also complained of by Spain as violations of her neutrality; but
were justified, or sought to be excused, by the United States, on the
ground of necessity; while no such ground was ever urged in justification of the invasion of East Florida, in 1812 and 1813.
It appears, from the correspondence between Mr. Adams and Mr.
Onis, which led to the treaty of 1819, that mutual indemnities for all
injuries were fully agreed upon before General Jackson entered Florid._a
in 1818:-(American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. 4, pp. 465,
467, 475.)
For all these injuries, Spain earnestly demanded satisfaction; and.
when the treaty of 1819 was concluded, the following provision was
inserted, and constitutes the last clause of the 9th article of that instrument, viz:
"The United States will cause satisfaction to be made for the injuries.;
if any, which, by process of law, shall be established to have been suffered by the Spanish officers and individual Spanish inhabitants by the
late operations of the American army in Florida. '' -(Statutes at Large,
volume 8, p. 260.)
''To carry into effect'' this provision of the treaty, Congress passed
the act of March 3, 1823, which is as follows:
"AN ACT to carry into effect the ninth article of the treaty concluded between the United
States and Spain the twenty-second day of February, one thousand eight hundred and
nineteen.

"SEc. 1. That the judges of the superior courts established at St.
Augustine and Pensacola, in the Territory of Florida, respectively,.
shall be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed to receive and
. adjust all claims arising within their respective jurisdictions, of the
inhabitants of said territory or their representatives, agreeably to the
provisions of the ninth article of the treaty with Spain, by which the
said Territory was ceded to the United States.
"SEc. 2. That in all cases in which said judge shall decide in favor
of the cbimants, the decisions, with the evidence on which they are
founded, shall be, by the said judges, reported to the Secretary of the
Treasury, who, on being satisfied that the same is just and equitable,
within the provisions of the said treaty, shall pay the amount thereof
to the person or persons in whose favor tho same is adjudged, ou~ of
any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated. Approved,
:March 3, 1823. "-(3 Statutes at Large, p. 768.)
After the passage of the said act, the judges proceeded to adjust
"claims arising within their respective jurisdictions," upon sworn
petitions of the claimants and proofs taken, as in chancery or admiralty cases. The judge of West Florida made decisions or a wards for
injuries suffered from the invasion of 1814 in that province; and tho
judge of East Florida, in like manner, proceeded to receive and adjudge
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claims for the injuries resulting from the invasion of 1812 and 1813 in
that province.
Mr. Secretary Crawford, however, decided that the injuries of 1814
in West Florida were not embra-ced by thP- treaty-either from the
supposed import of the word "late" in the English original, (but not
in the Spanish,) and which was construed to be synonymous with
latest or last, and therefore only applicable to the invasion of 1818,
or because the invasion of West Florida in 1814, during our war with
Great Britain, to expel the British forces and their Indian allies from
neutral territory used to originate operations against the UnitEd States,
was justified by the law of nations, and therefore was no injury, within
the true meaning of the treaty of 1819. Both these reasons were urged
against those claims.
When the decisions of the judge of East Florida, in favor of the
claimants, for injuries resulting from the invasions of 1812 and 1813,
were reported to the Treasury, Mr. Secretary Rush, the successor of
Mr. Crawford, applied Mr. Crawford's decision to those claims, though
the United States had never attempted to justify that invasion as
authorized by the law of nations, as they did the invasions of 1814 and
1818 in West Florida, by rejecting them. The claimants for injuries
in: 1812 and 1813, therefore, petitioned Congress for relief against this
e!roneous construction of the treaty; and Congress, by the act of 26th
June; 1834, overruled the decision of Mr. Secretary Rush, that the
injuries of 1812 and 1813 were not within the provisions of the treaty
of 1819, by the passage of the act of the 26th June, 1834, which is as
follows:
"AN ACT for the relief of certain inhabitants of East Florida.

"Be it enacted, &c., That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he
hereby is, authorized and directed to pay, out of any money in the
treasury not otherwise appropriated, the amount. awarded by the judge
of the superior court at St. Augustine, in the Territory of Florida,
under the authority of the 161st chapter of the acts of the 17th Congress, approved March 3, 1823, for losses occasioned in East Florida
by the troops in the service of the United States, in the years 1812
and 1813, in all cases where the decision of the said judge shall be
deemed by the Secretary of the Treasury to be just: Provided) That
no award be paid except in the case of those who, at the time of suffering the loss, were actual subjects of the Spanish government: And
provided also, That no award be paid for depredations committed in
East Florida previous to the entrance into that province of the agent or
troops ofthe United States.
"SEc. 2. And be it further enacted, That the judge of the superior
court of St. Augustine be, and he hereby is, authorized to receive, examine, and adJudge all cases of claims for losses occasioned by the
troops aforesaid, in 1812 and 1813, not heretofore presented to the said
judge, or in which the evidence was withheld, in consequence of the decision of the Secretary of the Tr-eas~try that such claims 1:0ere not provided
for by the trt·eaty of Febntary 22; 1819, betu;een the governments of the
United States and Spain: Provided, That such claims be presented to
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the said judge in the space of one year from the passage of this act :
And provided also) That the authority herein given shall be subject 'to
the restrictions created by the provisos to the preceding section.'' -(6
Statutes at Large, p. 569.)
.
At the time of the passage this act, claims for injuries in East. Florida, in 1812 and 1813, amounting to $214)676, had been presented to
the judge of East Florida, and decrees in favor of the claimants had
been made for the sum of $44,338. The first section of this act ma~e
an appropriation for the payment of the awards which were made previous to its passage, accompanied by provisions prohibiting payment
unless the ''claimants were actual subjects of the Spanish government,''
and unless the depredations were committed after "the entrance into
that province (East Florida) of the agent or troops of the United
States," upon the ground that such claims would not be within the
provisions of the treaty.
This act made no other appropriation, and no claim is now made
under any of the a wards provided for by the first section thereof, as
no award of damages under the name of interest had been made before
its passage.
The claims provided for by the second section of this act being
claims not then presented to the judge, or, if presented, being cases in
which proceedings had been suspended, ''in consequence of the decision
of the Secretary of the Treasury that such claims were not provided
for by the treaty," were left to be paid out of the general appropriation made by the second section of the act of 3d March, 1823, passed
to carry the treaty into effect, and have been so paid, as far as payments have been made.
Whenever the term of office of the judge of the superior court for
the district of East Florida expired by death, resignation, or removal,
the duty of adjudicating these claims was, with full sanction of the
Secretary of the Treasury, performed by his judicial successor ; and
when Florida was admitted into the Union as a State, and the federal
jurisdiction of the territorial judges was transferred to the Unitt:d
States judge, the duty of abjudicating such of these claims as yet remained to be decided was devolved upon the judge of the district court
of the United States for the northern district of Florida by the act of
22cl February, 1847.-(9 Statutes at Large, p. 130.)
A :Q.nmber of the claimants having failed to present their claims to
the judge within the time limited by the 2d section of the act of 26th
June, 1834, aforesaid, Congress, by an act approved on the 3d March,
1849, directed the United States judge for the northern district of
Florida to "receive and adjudicate" their claims, and directed that
they should be "settled," not adjudicated at the treasury, as other
claims under the act of 26th June, 1834, with the following provisos:
" Provided, however, That the petition for the allowance of such
claim shall be presented to said judge by the proper parties entitled to
prefer the same within one year from the passage of this act: .And
provided also, That said parties shall, respectively, allege in such petition, and prove to said judge reasonable cause for such petition not
having been presented within the time prescribed and enacted by said
act of June 26, 1834."-(9 Statutes at Large, p. 788.)
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After the passage of the act of June 26, 1834, recognizing the injuries of 1812 and 1813 to be within the provisions of the treaty, an<l
requiring the judge of the superior court of St. Augustine to ''receive,
examine, and adjudge" the same, the Ron. Robert Raymond Reid,
then the judge of the said court, proceeded to adjudicate the said claims,
and to report his decisions to the Secretary of the '..lreasury, according
to the provisions of the act of 3d March, 1R23, passed to carry the sai.d
treaty into effect. After he retired from office, the same duties continued to be performed by his successor, the Ron. Isaac H. Bronson,
until Florida was admitted into the Union as a State, when judge
Bronson, having been appointed United States judge for the northern
district of Florida, continued and closed the said duties. The mode
of proceeding in these cases, prescribed by the judge, and sanctioned
by the Treasury Department, was as follows:
· "Each claimant presented his claim by petition, verified by oath,
and alleging, as required by the rules prescribed b.r the court, the
nature and extent of his losses, and the facts necessary to show that
the claim was within the provisions of the treaty. The judge examined
the witnesses when personally brought before him, and when their
testimony was taken by deposition, he selected .and instructed the
commissioners, and propounded cross-interrogatories to the witnesses,
as is shown by the report of the Court of Claims in the case of Humphreys, and by the records remaining on file in the ~l.,reasury Department.
"All the evidence was recorded, and a copy of it, and of the decree
of the judge, when 'in favor of the claimants,' was reported to the
department for payment, as requi1:ed by the act of 1823.
''In making up his awards or decrees, the judge allowed, as the just
and proper measure of damages under the law of nations necessary to
fulfil the stipulations of the treaty, the proved value of the property
at the time of the injury or loss ; and, by way of satisfaction for the
further loss of the use, fruits, or profits of the property, whilst wrongfully deprived of them, and of the just satisfaction for them which the
law of nations required; and, during the period that no provision of
law existed for the presentation and payment of said claim, he added
five per cent. interest, by way of damages, and as an equitable measure
of damages, to the original value of the property, (being the legal
rate of the country,) and made a formal decree that the United~tates
p~y the same to the claimants.
The decrees thus made in favor of the
claimants were, as before stated, reported to the Secretary of the
'.rreasury for payment; when against them, they were deemed final,
and were never reported to the Secretary. The report of the Secretary
of the Treasury to the Senate shows tl1at more than half the amount
of the claims presented were thus finally disposed of hy the judgesthus making the decision of the judges against claimants final and
conclusive, whatever may have been the effect of decisions in their
fav01·.''
Judge Reid's reasons for allowing interest by way of damages, as
reported to the Secretary of the Treasury,_are as follows:
"I am required by the statute to receive, examine, and adJudge
these claims for losses. In performing this duty, I have allowed, be-
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cause it seemed just and equitable to allow it, inte'rest upon the
amount or value of the property ascertained to have been lost. The
rate of interest existing in the province at that time (1812 and 1813)
was five per cent., and this is the srim allowed in all cases. I am
sensible that this allowance will swell considerably the amount to be
paid to the claimants, but I do not perceive how it could be avoided.
If we lose sight of the national character of one of the parties, and
suppose two private persons engaged in a dispute about an injury to
property, the tribunal to which resort is had, in adjusting the
damages due by the one to the other, will consider the value of the
property destroyed, in connection with the time for which the owner
has been deprived of the use -and enjoyment of his property. The first
being ascertained in money, a compensation for the last may best be
regulated by reverting to the rate of interest allowed by the law of
the country where the wrong was done.-(R.eport of Court of Claims
in Robert Harrison's case, p. 78.)
When these claims reached the treasury, they were subjected to the
same scrutiny as claims which had never been adjudicated.* The
Secretaries claimed the right to go fully into the merits of the claims
upon the evidence reported, and called upon the judge for further
evidence whenever they entertained a doubt. In regard to the damages
decreed for the loss of the use and fruits of the property, it was rejected, in all instances, under the mere ~tsage of the Treasury Department in reference to domestic pecuniary demands, without any reference
to the treaty or the law of nations.
Secretary Woodbury's first decision, disallowing the damages decreed
under the name of interest, was made on the 20th December, 1836) in
the case of John Gianopoli, in which, in allowing the claim, he added
the words, "with the exception of interest, which it is believed has
not been allowed in claims similarly situated.'' -(1 val. J~tdicial Rec01·ds, Treasury Departmen.t, folio 145. Letter of William L. Hodge,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury, to l-Ion. Wm. A. Graham) dated June
9, 1851. Ex. Doc. No. 68, 2d sess. 24th Gong., H. R ). Ex, Doc. No.
98, 3d sess. 25th Gong., H. R.)
Mr. Secretary Guthrie, in a letter to the Attorney General in relation to these claims, dated the 4th November, 1854, says:
"This latter part of these claims (the interest) awarded by the
judges was first rejected by Mr. Secretary Woodbury, under 'the
usage of the Tt·easury Department,' in the case of the heirs of John
Gianopoli, the sum allowed as the value of the property on which was
paid on the 5th June, 1837, as shown by the accompanying papers;
and the decision thus made has continued to govern in these cases to thtpresent time.'' -(Report of the Court of Claims in Harrison's case) p.
81.)
Secretaries Ewing, Forward, and Bibb, who acted on these claims
after Mr. Woodbury, and followed his precedent in rejecting the part
of the damages or satisfaction decreed by the judges under the name
of interest, have all certified that they did so under the mere ~tsage of
*Report of Court of Claims in Robert Harrison's case, pp. 34, 35, 36, and 37.
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the Treasury Department, and without any reference to the treaty or
law of nations, and without any inquiry whether the payment of that
part of the award of the judges was necessary to make the "satisfaction" stipulated by the treaty, and they all express . the opinion that
rmch payment is necessary to fulfil the stipulation of the treaty.-(See
Report ofthe Court of Claims in Harrison's case, pp. 100 to 114; also
the report of Judge Bibb, assistant Attorney General, to the Attorney
General, from p. 81 top. 109 of the same document; also the statement of Mr. McClintock Young, late cp_ief clerk of the Treasury Department, from pages 34 to 37 of the same document.)
·Mr. Secretary Walker referred the question of the claimants' right,
under the treaty and law of nations, to this part of the damages decreed by the judges, to the Attorney General in 1849. An opinion was
given in 1851 affirming that right, and declaring the inapplicability
of departmental usage to treaty cases, but advising the Secretary to
adhere to Mr. Woodbury's precedent; which had been followed by his
successors in these cases, an.d leave the claimants to seek redress in
Congress.
A similar reference was made by l\ir. Secretary Guthrie, and a
similar answer from the Attorney General given; with a recommendation that the whole class of claims be referred by the department to
Congress.
In 1851, after the opinion of the Attorney General was given, recognizing the right of the claimants, under the treaty and law of nations,
to the damages decreed under the name of interest, but advising an
adherence to Mr. Woodbury's precedent of rejecting it under the
usage of the department, and leave the claimants to seek relief in
Congress, one of the claimants petitioned Congress for such ·furthe'r
legislation as might be necessary to the full execution of the treaty,
by the payment of that portion of the damages allowed by the judge
under the name of interest, and. rejected by the Secretary of the Treasury under the usage of his department. The memorial was referred
to the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, and that committee reported
that the acts already passed were intended, and were sufficient, to carry
the treaty into full effect, and that '' no additional legislation was
necessary;'' and this report was unanimously concurred in by the
Senate.-( Report of the Court of Claims in Harrison's case) pp. 118;
119, 120.)
Having shown that the claims of the memorialists are within the
treaty, and so declared by Congress, the next duty of the committee
is to ascertain the extent of the "satisfaction" which the United
States stipulate in the treaty shall be made for the injuries suffered
by the Spanish inhabitants of Florida during the invasion by the
American army.
The question as to what constitutes satisfaction in a case like the
present is not a new one. It has often been decided, and was long
since settled. The "satisfaction" to be made by the United States,
in pursuance of the stipulation of the ninth article of the treaty of 1819,
is a satisfaction for "injuries" suffered by the Spanish inhabitants of
Florida from the acts of our army in 1812 and 1813. The term "satisfaction," when used 'to measure the compensation to be made for
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injuries to property in violation of the law of nations, embraces the
fullest measure of redress enjoined by the great international code
designed to regulate the intercourse and settle the controversies of
nations.-(See Wheaton on International Law, pp. 340, 341, 342, and
576; 1 vol. Kent's Com., p. 61; Vattel, book 2, ch. 18, sec. 324;
lb., book 3, ch. 11, sec. 185; Campbell's Grotius, vol. 2, book 2, ch.
17, p. 192.)
Satisfaction, when used in the sense of redress for injuries to property, consists in the value of the property taken or destroyed, and
damages for its detention or the loss of its use until the time of payment. In the case of the Pacific Insurance Company vs. Conrad, 1
Baldwin, C. C. R., p. 138, Judge Baldwin says: "The value of the
property taken, with interest, from the time of the taking down, to
the time of the trial, is generally considered as the extent of the damages sustained." Rutherford, book 1, ch. 17, sec. 5, pp. 390, 391,
lays down the rule in the following words: ''In estimating the damage
which any one has sustained when such things as he has a perfect
right to are taken from him, or withholden, or intercepted, we are to
consider not only the value of the thing itself, but the value likewise
of the fruits or profits that might have arisen from it. He who is the
owner of a thing) is likewise the owner of such fruits or profits; so that
it is as properly a damage to be deprived of them, as to be deprived of
the thing itself."
In the case of the Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheaton) 560, the Supreme
Court of the United States says: "It was, after strict consideration,
held, that the prime cost or value of the property lost, at the
time of the loss, and, in case of injury, the diminution in value by
reason of the injury, with interest upon such value, afforded the true
measure of assessing the damages." In the case of the Lively, 1 Gallison, R. 315, Judge Story says: "The proper measure of damages,
in cases of illegal capture) is the prime value, and interest to the day
of the judgment.''
The rule as to the measure of satisfaction is the same in the prize
courts of Great Britain.-(Case of the Acteon, 2 Dodson, p. 84.)
Prize courts are governed by the laws and usages of nations) (1
Kent's Com., pp. 19, 68, 69, 70; Wheat. Int. Law, p. 47; Adeline and
Cargo, 9 Cranch, p. 191, also 242.) Wheaton on International Law,
p. 341, says: "If a nation has taken possession of what belongs to
another, if it refuses to pay a debt, or repair an injury, or to give
adequate satisfaction for it, the latter may seize something of the
former, and apply it to its own advantage until it obtains payment of
what is due, together with interrest and damages."
The civil and common law are governed by the same rule in measuring damages in cases of conversion or trespass. The value of the
property with interest, by wo,y of damages) from the time of the trespass or conversion, is the rule of both.-(Sedgwick on Measure of
Damages, pp. 549, 550, 551; 7 Wend., 354.) For the rule of the civil
law, see Domat., vol. 1, Lib. 3, Tit. 5.
The rule by which damages, in the name of interest, are allowed
in cases like the present is supported by an unbroken current of
authorities, derived as well from writers on the law of nations as from
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the decisions of the highest courts in Great Britain and the United
States ; and the authorities and precedents drawn from these sources
have been invariably insisted on by the government of the United
States, when seeking redress from other nations for injuries which our
citizens have sustained at their hands. Our government has demanded,.and uniformly obtained, the fullest measure of indemnity,
interest as well as principal being on all occasions exacted. In these
cases the United States are solemnly bound by the treaty to Spain
that satisfaction should be made for the injuries suffered by her subjects from the operations of our army. What was meant by the term
satisfaction, taken in connection with the rule of the law of nations
known and understood by both parties, and always acted upon by the
United States in seeking indemnity for injuries due to their own citizens at the hands of others? Did it mean that those who suffered
injuries should be indemnified; that they should be paid the amount
of the losses they had sustained? Or did it mean that they should
be paid a part of them-the principal value of the things lost, without compensation for the deprivation of the use? Would such part
payment make a man whole? Would it be a satisfaction? Would
a man who had been injured by the destruction of his cattle, or the
burning of his house, be satisfied or indemnified by receiving, twenty
years afterwards, the mere value of his property at the time it was
destroyed ? Was it no loss to be deprived of the use of his cattle
during twenty years? Was there no damagf3 in being deprived of
the shelter of his house during the same period? To satisfy or make
a man whole, under such circumstances, he must be paid immediately
on the happening of the injury, so that, by using the money thus received, he can at once replace his cattle or rebuild his house; or, otherwise, he must be allowed damages for being deprived of the use of
his cattle or the shelter of his house; and such damages are generally
ascertained by computing interest, at the usual rate, on the value of
the property fron1 the time of the injury until payment is made to
the owner. This, as has been stated already, is the rule of the law
of nations; it is also the rule of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and of the courts, as the committ~e believe, of every State in
the Union. In support of this position, a host of authorities might
be cited ; but it is deemed unnecessary to multiply cases to sustain a
usage believed to be nearly, if not quite, universal in reference to
.
cases like the present.
It may be proper, however, to refer to the practice of our own
government, and point out some of the cases in which interest, in addition to the value of the property injured or destroyed, has been
claimed and allowed in behalf of our own citizens.
The United States, in the construction of their treaties, and in all
their intercourse with other nations, have uniformly insisted upon and
sanctioned the measure of redress decreed by the Florida judges in
these cases, as affording the lowest measure of satisfaction for property
taken or destroyed in violation of treaties, or of the laws and usages of
nations.-(Vide opinion of Mr. Wirt, Attorney General, printed Opinions, pp. 568, 569, 570, 571; letter of Mr. Clay, Secretary of State, to
Mr. Vaughan, British minister, of the 15th April) 1826; Wheaton's
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IJife of \Vm. Pinckney, pp. 196, 198, 265, (note,) 371; American State
Papers, foreign relations, vol. 2, pp. 119, 120, 377, 388, 283; Ex.
Doc. No. 32, 1st sess. 25th Congress, Ho. Reps., p. 249; Ex. Doc.
IIo. Reps., 2d session 27th Congress, vol. 5, doc. 291, p. 50.; American State Papers, foreign relations, vol. 4, p. 639; Elliott's Diplomatic
Code, vol. 2, pp. 625, 605.)
r.rhese citations will show that interest, in addition to the value of
the property illegally taken, was claimed and allowed under the 7th
article of the treaty of 1794 with Great Rritain, (8th Statutes at
Large, p. 119 ;) under the word "losses," simply, in the 21st article
of the treaty of 1795, with Spain, (8th Statutes at Large, p. 150 ;) under
the words "just indemnification for private property carried away,"
in the convention of 1818, between the United States and Great
Britain, (8th Statutes at Large, p. 249 ;) under the law of nations, by
Brazil, without any treaty stipulations; under the words "injuries to
property," the same words employed in the 9th article of the Florida
treaty, in the convention of the 11th April, 1839, between the United
States and Mexico, (8th Statutes at Large, p. 526 ;) under the 14th
article of the treaty of 2d February, 1848, between the United States
and Mexico, (records of the board of commissioners, on file in the State
Department.) The indemnity 'in this case was paid by the United
States to their own citizens in behalf of Mexico, in consideration of the
cession of California and New Mexico.
These authorities also show that the United States, in their negotiations with other nations, have recognized no other rule of satisfaction for injury to property, in violation of the laws of nations, than that
decreed by the Florida judges in these cases; and that whenever they
have been able to obtain a treaty stipulation for "indemnification,"
for satisfaction for "losses," for satisfaction for "injury to property,"
or in any form of language implying compensation or satisfaction for
injury to property in violation of treaty stipulations or of the laws of
nations, they have uniformly claimed and received, or paid out of their
own treasury, the same measure of satisfaction.
Under the treaty of Ghent, between the United States and Great
Britain, a difference arose, which was referred to the arbitrament of
the Emperor of Russia, who decided that the United States were entitled "to a just indemnification from Great Britain for all private
property carried away by the British forces." The members of the
joint commission, lVIessrs. Langdon Cheves and Jackson, differed as
to the measure of damages. Mr. Cheves insisted on interest from the
time of taking the property, in addition to its value, as the measure of
damages. He said the claim was not for interest, eo nomine, but
adopted as a mitigated rule of damages or compensation, founded on
the pecuniary value of the property withheld ; and that in such cases
the common law and civil law both allowed reparation or compensation
for the loss of the use of the property withheld from the commencement
of the tortious detention. The rule of the public law, he said, was the
same; and that, if the property captured and taken away in February,
1815, were returned now uninjured, it would not repair the loss sustained by the taking away and detention. The claimant would still
be without indemnity for the loss of the 'Use of his property for ten
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years, which was nearly equivalent to the original value of the principal thing. Mr. Wirt sustained ~he rule as stated by Mr. Cheves.
(Opinions of Attorney General, vol. 1, p. 499, of l\1ay 17, 1826.) Mr.
Clay, in _a letter dated April 15, 1826, to the British minister, Mr.
Vaughan, declared "that interest was a just component part of the indemnification which the convention stipulated.'' rrhis rule was finally
recognized by the British government, though the amount paid in
gross was something less than the interest would have been if computed at the ordinary rate.
In the negotiations between the United States and Great Britain, in
relation to the cases of the "Encomium" and "Comet," Mr. Stevenson, the American minister, under the instructions of the State De- ·
partment, laid down the following propositions, which were fully admitted by Lord Palmerston. These propositions, it will be seen,
relate to the measure of damages proper to be allowed for the taking
a?d ~etention, or destruction of property, in several distinct points of
v1ew.
1. "That if a duty to be performed be not the payment of money,
but the performance of some collateral act, that is the restitution of
property, (other than money,) then, in lieu of interest, damages are
awarded, and these damages, together with the property to be returned,
are to constitute the indemnity of the sufferer for the loss he may have
sustained by reason of the non-performance of this duty.''
2. "That the measure of these damages will be the probable fruits
or profits which might have been derived from the property or thing
detained, during the period that the duty of restoring it was not performed.''
3. "That if restitution of the property cannot be made, by reason of
its loss, or from any other cause, then its value may be estimated in
money, and this equivalent will stand in the place of the thing itself;
and when reduced to a pecuniary standard, interest upon the equivalent is allowed in lieu of the fruits and profits, and flows, as in other
cases of money not paid, as the necessary consequence of the non-performance of the duty of restitution.''
4. "That, although under the laws of Great Britain and the United
States, it is admitted that, in transactions between individuals, interest
eo nomine would not be due on unliquidated demands of a nature purely
and exclusively pecuniary, except from the period of their liquidation;
yet it is equally true that, by those laws, when reparation is sought
for loss of property, (in cases like the present,) the value of the property, together with an equivalent for the use of it, from the commencement of an illegal detention, is always allowed."
5. "That these are principles sanctioned as well by the law of nations as those of the civil and common law, by the authority of precedents between Great Britain and the United States, a few leading
references will satisfactorily show. To these the undersigned begs
leave to refer Lord Palmerston.''
Mr. Stevenson then cites Grotius, as cited in support of the Florida
claims. Also, _2d vol. Campbell's Grotius, p. 360; vol. 6, sec. 1244.
Cites Domat, to show that fruits and profits were allowed by the civil
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law as cited by Judge Bronson. Cites Pothier, Code Napoleon, Blackstone, Vesey's R., 2 Brown's C. C., and says:
"It (interest) has, moreover, never been Tejused in claims like the
present, where a money equivalent has been substituted as a compensation for property wrongfully withheld, and for which the party had
agreed to make reparation."
Mr. Stevenson then shows that interest was allowed under the 6th
and 7th articles of Jay's treaty in 1794, and refers to the opinion of
Sir John Nicoll, one of the British commissioners, under the 7th article of said treaty; also, to the decision of Sir William Scott, in the
case of the "Acteon," cited by Judge Bronson, and proceeds to say
that "the general doctrine, then, is, that he who withholds what he
ought to return, does an injury for which he is bound to indemnify the
sufferer ; that the proper measure of indemnification is the thing
which is withheld, together with its reasonable fruits or profits accruing during the period that it is withheld; that if, however, restitution
of the property cannot be had, justice finds its compensation, or its
value as an equivalent, and interest on it is resorted to as the best
standard to ascertain the reasonable profits of money."
Having thus shown that the "satisfaction" stipulated in the treaty
required that damages or interest for the detention of the property, or
loss of its use, should be added to its original value, as well by the
constant and uniform practice of our own government, as by the rules
of the law of nations, and of the common and civil law, it follows as
a necessary and unavoidable consequence, that it was the duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury to pay the amounts awarded to the memorialists, and other claimants of the same class, by the Florida judges,
in full, original value and interest. The memorialists, and all other
claimants of the same class, had as just a right to the damages
awarded by the judges for the loss of the use of the property which
had been destroyed or carried away by our troops, as to the original
value of the said property; and the injustice of refusing to pay the
latter would have been in no respect greater than was the injustice of
refusing to pay the former; and that damages for the injury done to
the claimants by the loss of the use and enjoyment of the property,
during the many years that elapsed before its original value was
repaid, are, under the law and usages of nations, as well as by the
rules of common and civil law, as much a part of the satisfaction contemplated by the treaty, as was the value of the property destroyed~
The sums due to these claimants, and awarded to them, as damages
for the deprivation of the use of their property, have not been paid,
solely in consequence of a decision of Mr. Wood bury, Secretary of the
Treasury, made under a departmental usage in reference to domestic
pecuniary demands.
That a treaty, being a contract between two independent nations, is
to be controlled in its construction, not by the local usages of either,
but by the universal rules of the international code, is too clear for
argument. rrhe committee believe that l\h. Woodbury would have
t.aken this view of his duty in the premises, if it had been presented
to his attention. While the decision of Mr. Woodbury has not been
reYersed, the right of these claimants under the treaty to the pay-
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ment of the awards of damage, under the name of interest, haR not
been denied by any Secretary of the Treasury who has acted upon the
awards of the judges, or any Attorney General, since Mr. Woodbury's
time, but has been expressly admitted by Secretaries Spencer, Bibb,
Corwin, and Forward, and by Attorneys General Crittenden and
Cushing.
The Court of Claims, in deciding upon the cases of the claimants,
also seem to admit their rights under the treaty, although regarding
them as without remedy under the acts of Congress passed to give
effect to the treaty, construed as tho~e acts are by the Court of Claims,
so as to give the Secretary of the Treasury an unlimited power to
revise and reduce awards made in favor of individuals by the Florida
judges. And that there is no appeal from the Secretary of the Treasury
to any judicial tribunal, is settled by the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The claimants are now, therefore, before the tribunal of Congress,
which is uncontrolled by departmental usages or decisions, or by prior
legislation, and which is now called upon to do justice, and cause the
stipulations of the treaty of 1819 to be carried into effect.
If that treaty requires that the claimants should be indemnified for
the loss of the use of their property, as well as for the loss of the 01·iginal value of their property, the duty of this government to make such
indemnification is not impaired by the erroneous and inadvertent decision of one of its executive officers. This government can never set
up against the reclamations of Spain an adjudication by the Treasury
Department, manifestly in violation of the law of nations. In the case
of the United States vs. The Schooner Peggy, 1 Cranch. 103, Chief
Justice Marshall, in confirmation of this principle, said: "Whatever
the decision of the court may be, the claim 1pon the nation) if 'l.tnsatisfied, may still be asseTted.''
·
It has been much controverted, in the history of these cases, whether
the decisions of the Florida judges were judicial and final; and if not,
to what extent a revising power was intended to be conferred upon the
Secretary of the Treasury, by the acts of Congress relating to the subject. The committee have not regarded it as necessary to enter into
these controversies. It is sufficient that the original value of the property belonging to the claimants, for the destruction of which they arc
entitled to indemnity, has been settled by tribunals to which that duty
was assigned by this government ; that that original value has been
admitted and paid at the treasury, after a careful revisal, with a deduction so slight that the substantial correctness of the decisions in Florida
is not impeached, and that the only question which now remains relates to the duty of indemnifying the claimants for the loss of the usc
of their property. This duty, independently of the decisions of the
Florida judges, your committee, for the reasons hereinbefore given,
regard as entirely clear.
The amount to be paid, if the views of the committee are correct,
is large; but this cannot alter their substantial justice nor discharge
the duty. If it is unjust, and in violation of the national faith, to withhold the payment, the magnitude and evil consequences of this injustice and violation of national faith, and the hardships which result
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from them to individuals, are augmented in precise proportion to the
amount withheld.
It is the interest of the United States, as a commercial nation, with
property exposed to violence in every part of the world, to resist any
change or relaxation of the rule of public law, which prescribes, as the
measure of indemnification for injuries to property, the restoration of
its original value, together with compensation for the loss of its use.
This government, which has always heretofore insisted upon this rule,
cannot insist upon it hereafter, as against others, if it shall finally decline to act upon the rule in these cases.
The committee, therefore, report a bill, requiring the payment of
that portion of the damages awarded by the judges, under the name of
interest, so far as the original value awarded by the said judges has been
approved at the Treasury Department, and recommend its passage.
The committee also append the argument of Mr. Webster in relation to the validity of these clai1ns for interest, under the treaty of
1819, and the acts of Congress of 1823 and of 1834.

n.
Opinion of the Han. Daniel Webster on the Florida claims a1·ising under
the ninth article of the treaty of 1819, between the United States and
Spain.
The questions propounded by Mr. Secretary \Valker, upon which
the following opinion of Mr. Webster was given, are as follo,vs:
1. "Whether the provisions of the treaty require the losses or injuries for which satisfaction is provided, to be established judicially?
And if so, whether decrees of the judges as to the amount or extent
of said losses or injuries-as to cases within the provisions of the
treaty-are final?
2. "Whether the measure or rate of satisfaction adopted and applied
by the judges in these cases, namely, to add to the value of the property, at the time of its loss, interest as a compensation for the loss or
deprivation of its use, is or is not in accordance with the laws and
usages of nations, as the proper rule of redress for such injuries, and
can be allowed and paid by this Department under the acts of Congress
applicable to this subject?"
OPINION.

· It appears to me that great misconception has prevailed respecting
the true construction of the ninth article of the treaty with Spain of
1819, and of the two acts of Congress passed for the purpose of carrying the provisions of that article into effect.
Before the date of the treaty, and while Florida yet belonged to
Spain, that is to say, in the years 1812, 1813, and 1818, inroads were
made in Florida by certain troops of the United States, and injurie.;
and excesses committed on the inhabitants.
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Although Spain was now about to cede the whole territory to the
United States, yet her Government felt it to be its duty to cause a stipulation to be contained in the treaty of cession providing satisfaction
for these injuries, and fnll indemnification for the sufferers.
Instead of a joint commission, or mutual arbitration, to ascertain
these injuries, and adjudge the proper compensation, the contracting
parties agreed that this duty should be performed by a judicial tribunal. There was good reason for this. The injuries were local.
They were committed on the property, real and personal, of the inhabitants. The parties were all in Florida, and the proofs all in Florida. Judicial courts were now about to be established in Florida,
under the authority of the United States; and nothing could be more
just or expedient, than that to these courts, sitting in the Territory,
should be assigned the duty of inquiring into these cases, and establishing the right and the amount of indemnification where such right
was proved. The ninth article of the treaty provided, therefore, that
"The United States will cause satisfaction to be made for the injuries, if any, which, by process of law, shall be established to have
been suffered by the Spanish officers, and individual Spanish inhabitants, by the late operations of the American army in Florida."
At the commencement of any discussion of the questions arising in
this case, some propositions must be received and admitted as undoubted
truths.
I. The first is, that a treaty is the supreme law of the land. It
can neither be limited, nor restrained, nor modified, nor altered. It
stands on the ground of national contract, and is declared by the
Constitution to be the supreme law of the land; and this gives it a
character higher than any act of ordinary legislation. It enjoys an
immunity from the operation and effects of all such legislation.
From this acknowledged truth, there results a rule of construction,
of very great importance, and which is to be applied to all laws passed
for the professed purpose of carrying treaty stipulations into effect;
and that is, that such laws must be so construed as to conform to the
provisions of the treaty, and give them full effect, and not so as to
thwart those provisions and embarrass their operation and application
by imposing new limitations or conditions, or by any other means.
The advantages secured by a treaty stipulation to those for whose benefit it was entered into, cannot be abridged or curtailed by any law
passed for executing the treaty. The treaty and the law must be made
to stand together, where they can and so far as they can; and if, after
all, there be found an irreconcilable inconsistency, the law must give
way to the treaty.
II. A second general proposition, equally certain and well established, is, that the terms and the language used in a treaty, are
always to be interpreted according to the laws of nations, and not
according to any municipal code. This rule is of universal application. When two nations speak to each other, they use the language
of nations. Their intercourse is regulated, and their mutual agreements and obligations are to be interpreted by that code only, which
we usually denominate the public law of the world. This public law
is not one thing at Rome, another at Loudon, and a third at Wash-
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ington. It is the same in all civilized States; everywhere speaking
with the same voice and the same authority.
Guided by these elementary rules, let us examine the treaty and the
laws.
The words of the treaty are plain: "The United States will cause
satisfaction to be made for the injuries, if any, which, by process of
law, shall be established to have been suffered by the Spanish officers,
and individual Spanish inhabitants, by the late operations of the
American army in :Florida.''
The terms ''process of law'' are the terms usually employed to
describe judicial proceedings. They are exactly equivalent to the
phrase "due course of law," or judgment of law.
They imply parties, a case, a hearing, a trial, and a judgment, or
decision. This is their interpretation in every book of authority from
Magna Charta down; and it is precisely the sense in which the words
are used in the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of
the United States. In that article it is declared that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
That is, without hearing, trial, and regular judgment.
"Process of law," as the words are used in the treaty, mean any
kind of judicial proceedings, suited to the case. It may be common
law process, equity process, or admiralty process, as the case may
require. But whatever be the particular form of the proceeding, it
must be a judicial proceeding; a proce~ding which involves a hearing,
a trial, and a judgment.
The treaty acknowledges that there are, or may be, persons who
have suffered injuries, by the operations of the American army in
Florida; and it promises satisfaction, to all such persons, when those
injuries shall have been established by process of law.
To establish an injury by process of law, is to prove that injury
before some competent judicial tribunal; to cause its character, and
its amount, to be ascertained and fixed, and judgment thereon pronounced and declared. And this judgment, supposing it always to be
rendered by a judicial tribunal acting within its jurisdiction, cannot be
vacated, annulled, reversed, or altered, except by some higher appellate
power, itself proceeding, also, by clue process of law.
Two consequences follow from these premises:
I. No one can claim any compensation, or satisfaction, under this
clause of the treaty, who cannot establish the fact of an injury, and
fix its amount, by regular judicial proceeding and judgment.
II. Any one ·who has established the fact of an injury, ~;tnd the just
measure of satisfaction, by regular legal proceedings and judgment,
cannot be deprived of that satisfaction, or any part of it, by the superinduced authority of a mere executive officer, or politica:l functionary.
rrhat .would be in the very teeth of the treat.y. It might just as
well be said, that under this clauAe, an executive officer, or a political
functionary, might be authorized to decide on the case of an alleged
injury, and the satisfaction justly clue, if any, originally, and in the
first instance, without any reference whatever to a hearing, trial, or
judgment by process of law. For if that which the treaty says shall
be "established by process of law" may be enlarged, diminished,
Rep. No. 93--2
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changed, or altered by the mere discretion of an individual, then it is
evident, this particular provision of the treaty becomes a dead letter ;
and the whole clause means no more, than that satisfaction · shall be
made for injuries, in any way that the government may see fit to
provide; and that all cases may be disposed of, by executive agents or
officers, without hearing, trial, or judgment, if they so see fit; in other
words, without" process of law."
The mode of ascertaining and establishing the injury is as much a
part of the treaty as the obligation to make satisfaction for it. It is an
important, essential, substantial part of the stipulation. It would be
no more a violation of good faith, on the part of the Government of
the United States, to refuse to make any satisfaction at all, than it
would to refuse that particular satisfaction which it has promised by
the treaty. The parties in interest, have a right to demand, that they
shall have an opportunity of establishing the injuries done them, and
seeking satisfaction for those injuries, in the mode expressly stipulated
in the treaty; and to reject that mode, and to adopt another, without
their consent, would be a flagrant injustice, and an outrage on public
faith. All this appears tome to be too plain to require further discussion.
If any authority be required to show the settled meaning of the
terms "process of law," reference may be had to 3d Story's Commentaries on the Constitution, sections 1782-83, pages 660, 661. 2cl
Kent's Commentaries, 6th edition, pages 12, 13, note b. Baldwin's
Views, page 137. Tucker's Blackstone, vol. 1, part 1, appendix, p.
203. Taylor vs. Porter and Ford, 4 Hill's New York Reps. p. 140.
19 Wenclall's Rep. p. 676.
We come next to consider the acts which, have been passed by Congress for carrying this part of the treaty into effect.
The first act was passed on the 3d day of lVIarch, 1823. The second
on the 26th of June, 1834.
These acts, with their titles, are set forth and recited in the case.
These acts, or laws, were enacted in pari maten:a; the latter refers
to the former, and extends its provisions. They are, therefore, to be
considered together, and such a construction if practicable, given to
them, as shall produce a harmonious result~ And, I have already said,
that they must be so construed as to carry the treaty, in its plain and
just sense, into full and complete operation ; not so as to modify or
alter it; not so as to embarrass and hamper its provisions ; not so as
to deprive the parties interested in its provisions of any of the advantages or benefits intended for them.
The principal difficulty arises from the second section of the first
act; the words of which, are:
"That, in all cases in which said judges shall decide in favor of the
claimants, the decisions, with the evidence on which they are founded,
shall be by the said judges, reported to the Secretary of the Treasury,
who, on being satisfied that the same is (are) just and equitable, within
the provisions of the said treaty, shall pay the amount thereof, to the
})erson or persons in whose favor the same is adjudged, out of any
money in the rrreasury not otherwise appropriated."
According to the case stated, it would appear that, under the supposed authority of this section, the Secretary assumed and exerciseda
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full appellate power over the judgments and decrees of the courts, reexamining the decrees on their general merits, and on the whole evidence, and reducing and altering them at his own unlimited discretion;
and, especially, that he struck out interest in all cases in which the
courts had allowed it, as being no just part of the satisfaction intended
by the treaty.
Such a construction of this section as would confer this power on the
Secretary of the Treasury cannot be received and enforced, in my judgment, without overturning the plainest principles of conFititutional and
public law. If the section cannot be made to bear another construction, then it must be wholly rejected as being inconsistent with the
treaty; and, therefore, repugnant to the Constitution of the United
States.
By the treaty, the injury of the suffering party is to be established
by process of law. It is absurd to say that this provision would be
satisfied by a decision of the Secretary of the Treasury. Such a decision
is no process of law.
But there is a construction which may be given to this second section, without violence, which will make it sensible, proper, and quite
consistent with that clause of the treaty which it was the object of the
whole act to carry into effect.
The courts before whom these claims were brought were courts of
limited jurisdiction. They were courts, they were judicial tribunals;
their proceedings were by process of law. Nevertheless, they were
tribunals of a specific and limited, and not of a general jurisdiction.
The act of Congress declared, in the first section:
''That the judges of the superior courts, established at St. Augustine
and Pensacola, in the Territory of Florida, respectively, shall be, and
they are hereby, authorized and directed to receive and ad;just all claims
arising within their respective jurisdictions, of the inhabitants of said
territory, or their representatives, agreeably to the provisions of the
ninth article of the treaty with Spain, by which the said territory was
ceded to the United States."
I may remark, in passing, that the word "adjust" in this section is
either a clerical error for ''adjudge,'' or, if the word were really ''adjust," the meaning evidently was the same as "adjudge;" because, in
the following section, the act says that the Secretary of the Treasury,
on being satisfied, &c., shall pay the amount thereof to the person or
persons in whose favor the same is "adJudged."
I may remark, further, that it is quite frivolous to contend that the
treaty required a judicial trial only for the purpose of proving the fact
of injury, and that the amount of satisfaction may still be left to be
fixed by an executive officer. To establish an injury or wrong, doJ?-e
by one party and suffered by another, by process of law, is to ascertain
and fix the amount of the injury, as well as the fact of its having been
committed. No other sense can be given to the word; and so Congress
understood it, for the law provides that the courts shall receive and
adjust (adjudge) the claims, and decide thereon, and that the amount
by them ad;judged, the Secretary of the Treasury being satisfied, &c.,
shall be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated; so that the whole question comes again to this: What is the
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extent of authority which the second section of the act gave, or could
give, to the Secretary of the Treasury over the decrees or judgments of
the courts?
These courts, as I have said, were courts of limited jurisdiction; but,
like other such courts, they must judge for themselves, in the first
instance, of thr. extent of their own jurisdiction. When a case is brought
before them, they n1ust decide whether it is a case to which their authority extends; and, as they decide this necessarily preliminary question,
. so they will, or will not, proceed to hear and decide the cause.
But their decision on the extent of their own jurisdiction may be
inquired into and examined: First, by a court of appellate jurisdiction,
if any such be established by law. Second, by any party called to act
on the case, and whose duty it is to carry all lawful decisions of the
court into execution. In such a case it is evident that the party acts
at his peril, and he can judge of nothing but the very question of jurisdiction.
If a sheriff be called on to serve process, he may, for his own safety,
inquire whether the court from which the process issued had jurisdiction in the case, so as that he will be justified in obeying its orders;
but he cannot inquire into the correctness of the judgment on which the
process issued. So, if an officer be required to collect a tax, he must
first know, or be able to see, whether the tax has been levied or
assessed by competent authority.
If a disbursing officer be required to pay money, he must, in like
manner, take care to be satisfied that the authority requiring the payment was competent to make the requisition; but he cannot judge of
the merits or demerits of the claim on which the allowance was made,
and payment demanded, if it be the case of a private claim, nor of the
propriety or impropriety of the decision, if the case be of a public nature.
It is enough for him to see that the command comes from lawful authority, and he needs to look no further.
Now this, I suppose, is the whole authority which the act of Congress intended to give, as it is most clearly all that it could give, to the
Secretary of the Treasury in regard to the judgments of these courts.
The phraseology, it is true, is not very accurate. The words are, that
the Secretary of the rrreasury, on being satisfied that the decision of
the court is "just and equitable, within the provisions of the treaty,"
shall pay the amount thereof.
This I understand to mean no more than if the words had been, that
the Secretary of the Treasury, on being satisfied that the decision is
justly and equitably within the treaty, shall pay the amount.
To be "justly and equitably" within the treaty, is to be within the
treaty. And if the Secretary of the Treasury finds, on looking at the
proceedings, that the case was one within the treaty; that is, that it
was the case of an injury committed in Florida, on Spanish officers or
individual Spanish inhabitants, by the army of the United States, then
he is to pay the amount adjudged.
This, in my opinion, is the entire extent of his authority of supervision. He has no right whatever to open the judgment, examine
the merits of the case, weigh the evidence, and reform the judicial
decision. It is preposterous to say that, when the Secretary of the
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Treasury exercises this supposed power, and reverses the judgment of
the courts, the injury of the party complaining has been ''established''
by "process of law," according to the solemn stipulations of the
treaty.
I see nothing in the second act materially affecting the remarks
which I have made on the first. That act had two objects, connected
with one subject.
The court in East Florida had allowed certain claims for depredations committed as early as in the years 1812 and 1813, and other
claims of the same description were known to exist. The Secretary of
the Treasury had rejected or reversed all judgments founded on such
claims, they not being, in his opinion, within the treaty.
The act of 1834, provides that the amount of the judgments in these
cases, already rendered, . should be paid as judgments in other cases;
and that claims of this class, not as yet decided and adjudged, should
be received, examined, and adjudged in like manner as the cases arising in 1818, and subject to provisos which confirm, strongly, the view
I have taken of the first act.
The evident object, and all the object, of the act of 1834, was to
place claims for injuries in 1812 ancl 1813 on the same footing with
those for like injuries in 1818.
This act was passed, not as making any new or independent provision for claims, but simply for the purpose of declaring the sense of
Congress, ·that the injuries committed in the years 1812 and 1813 are
within the treaty, confirming thus, the opinion of the court, and
reversing that of the Secretary of the Treasury. This point is therefore now settled.
It appears that the Secretary of the Treasury, in the exercise of his
supposed or assumed appellate power, struck out interest in all cases
in which it formed a part of the amount adjudged by the court. If
the opinions already expressed be well founded, the Secretary could
lawfully exercise no such power. The courts adopted, and had a
right to adopt, their owu rule for assessing damages and awarding
amounts in the cases before them. If they saw fit to allow interest,
it was an exercise of their judicial power with which the Secretary
could not interfere.
In such a case, the claim for interest was established by process of
law, as much as the claim for the original injury. It was ?'es Judica.
It had become a judgment of a competent, and the only competent,
tribunal; and the Secretary could not disturl1 it, by rejecting any
part, any more than by overthrowing the whole. But as this is an
important question, I propose to consider it on principle, and independent of the judicial decision in a particular case.
A vague notion has been prevalent, and the {xpression of it has
often bee~ ·repeated, that the government of the United States never
pays interest. This is not at all correct, in point of fact. Interest
has been allowed to claimants by the acts of Congress in almost innumerable instances.
But if such a rule did exist, it would not effect this case in the
slightest degree. Nothing more can be understood from any such
rule, than that in matters of account, or on deferred debts, claims, or
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demands, the Treasury Department does not allow interest. This
proceeds on the presumption that accounts will be promptly rendered,
and all claims and debts presented and paid when due.
But in cases, such as I am now considering, interest is allowed, not
as interest in its ordinary sense, that is to say, as augmentation, ninning and growing on a fixed sum. It is regarded merely as a part or
element in the loss or injury, or as a just mode of fixing the amount
of damages.
An individual has suffered a wrong, a loss and injury inflicted on
his property, for which the government is liable, and for which it feels
bound to provide him redress. But that redress cannot, in many
cases, be instantaneous or immediate. Before it can be possibly obtained in the appointed course, much time is consumed, much personal
attention demanded, and often heavy expenses incurred. These are
all direct and immediate consequences of the original loss or injury;
they form a part of it, and in all justice and equity enhance the just
claim for indemnity.
Different tribunals deal with these portions of the loss and injury,
in different ways, all of them being reasonable in themselves. One
thinks it just to make specific allowances for the loss of use of capital,
and for time, expenses, and charges; another, as a simple mode,
makes one allowance to cover them all, under the name of interest,
and adds this to the amount of the original loss, as proved; a third
combines all parts of the compensation together, fl.1rms one aggregate,
and awards a round sum, or sum in gross for the whole. It is in the
discretion of any tribunal, called on to make satisfaction for a loss or
an injury, to adopt either of these modes.
But the importance of this question calls on me to go further; and
I maintain that it was the bounden duty of the courts to add interest,
in these cases, to the original amount of loss prove([ They could not
escape from this duty, without a manifest departure from principle.
We are now construing a treaty, a solemn compact between nations.
This compact between nations, this treaty, is to be construed and interpreted throughout its whole length and breadth, in its general
provisions, and in all its details, in every phrase, sentence, word, and
syllable in it, by the settled rules of the law of nations. No municipal
code can touch it, no local municipal law affect it, no practice of an
administrative department come near it. Over all its terms, over all
its doubts, over all its ambiguities, if it have any, the law of nations
" sits ar bi tress."
The treaty, in this 9th clause, speaks of satisfaction to be made for
injuries; and injuries which had been committed by violence, by armed
men, acting without right, and without authority. And I maintain
that there is, in the code of national law, a fixed and settled rule,
founded in reason, and established by the highest authorities, by which
satisfaction for such injuries is to be ascertained and adjudged.
This rule is laid down by Rutherforth, in·these terms:
"In estimating the damages which any one has sustained, when
such things as he has a perfect right to, are unjustly taken from him,
or withholden, or intercepted, we are to consider not only the value
of the thing itself, but the value likewise of the fruits or profits that
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might have arisen from it. He who is the owner of the thing, is likewise the owner of such fruits or profits. So that it is as properly a
damage to be deprived of them, as it is to be deprived of the thing
itself."-Lib. 1, chap. 17, sec. 5.
The language of Grotius is:
"The loss or diminution of any one's possessions is not confined to
injuries done the substance alone of the property, but includes everything
affecting the produce of it, wh-ether it has been gathered or not. If
the owner himself had reaped it, the necessary expense of reaping, or
of improving the property to raise a produce, must also be taken into
the account of the loss, and form part of the damages." -Campbell's
Grotius, vol. 2, pages 195, 196. Lib. 2, chap. 17, sec. 4.
In laying down the rule for the satisfaction of inJuries) in the case
of reprisals, in making which the strictest caution is enjoined not to
transcend the clearest rules of justice, Mr. Wheaton, in his book on
national law, says:
"If a nation has taken possession of what belongs to another, if it
refuses to pay a debt, to repair an injury, or to give adequate satisfaction for it, the latter may seize something of the former, and apply
it to its own advantage, till it obtains payment of what is due, together
wrrH INTEREST AXD DAMAGES."-Wheaton on International Law,
1)age 341.
Mr. Wheaton, in the above passage, has copied, and hardly varied
the text of Vattel. - Lib. 2, chap. 18, sec. 342.
To avoid trouble and detail in ascertaining the actual amount of
damages or injury, resulting from the loss of the fruit, or profit of the
thing lost, or destroyed, the modern practice of nations, when 1naking
compensation for losses and injuries by joint commissions, as well as
the daily practice of courts sitting under the law of nations, is to allow
interest, at the legal rate, as a compensation for the loss of fruits and
profits, as a substitution for an actual and detailed account of such
fruits and profits.
.
[That the prize courts are governed by the laws of nations, see
Kent's Com., 5th edition, pages 68, 69, 70; 9 Cranch, 191, 244.]
The Supreme Court of the United States uniformly holds the same
dodrine:
"The prime cost or value of the property lost, and, in cases of
injury, the diminution in value by reason of the injury, with interest
thereon, affords the true rule for estimating damages in such cases.''3 Wheaton, page 546-The Amiable Nancy.
Sec, also, 1 Gallison ' s, 315, to the same point, case of the Lively.
The rule is exactly the same in the English courts, sitting under the
law of nations.-2 Dobson, page 84.
It now only remains to be added, that the government of the United
States, in its intercourse with foreign nations, and in demanding at
their hands reparation for injuries, has not only recognized the principle, and the rule, as above stated, but has affirmed them, with
emphasis, and insisted. on their application in all cases. It will hardly
. be thought necessary to go through our whole history, to collect cases
to this point. I content myself with calling attention to one of the
most conspicuous, and which it is quite impossible to distinguish, in
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point of principle, from the cases provided for in the 9th clause of the
treaty of 1819, ·which I am now considering.
A questLon arose, under the convention of St. Petersburg, between
the United States and Great Britain, respecting property alleged to
have been carried away by the British forces; at the .close of the last
war with England, in contravention of the stipulations contained in
the treaty of Ghent. Great Britain admitted the carrying away, but
denied that it was any infraction of the treaty. The question in difference was submitted to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia, and
he made an award in these terms:
"The United States of America are entitled to a just indemnification
from Great Britain for all private property carried away by the ,British
forces.''
For the purpose of carrying this award into effect, a joint commission was instituted to sit at Washington, the American commissioner
being Mr. Langdon Cheves, and the British commission, Mr. George
Jackson. They differed on the question of interest. In the end, the
matter was compromised, by the payment, on the part of Great Britain,
of a gross sum, which was distributed by the government of the United
States, first, in paying off the principal of each claim, and secondly,
for paying interest on the several claims, so far as the residue of the
sum received ·would extend.
The claim of the government of the United Statet:l was clearly and
ably set forth by the American commissioner, Mr. Cheves; and to
avoid length, and repetition, I append to this opinion extracts from
his remarks.-(See Appendix.)
The treaty between the United States and 1fexico, of the 11th of
April, 1839, provided for the institution of a joint commission for
ascertaining and determining the claims arising from injuries to the
persons and property of the citizens of the United States by Mexican
authorities.
The 1st and 5th articles of the treaty provided as follows:
"ARTICLE 1. That all claims of citizens of the United States should
be referred to a joint board of commissioners, who should be sw'Urn
impartially to examine and decide upon said claims.''
''ARTICLE 5. That the said commissioners shall, by a report under
their hands and seals, decide upon the justice of the said claims, and
the amount of compensation, if any, due from the Mexican government in each case.' '
These articles contain all the provisions of the treaty, respecting the
duties and powers of the com1nissioners.
The act of Congress of 12th June, 1840, "to carry into effect" said
treaty, provided for the appointment of two commissioners on the part
of the United States, who, with two others on the part of Mexico,
"shall form a board, whose duty it shall be to receive and examine all
claims provided for by the convention, and to decide thereon according
to the provisions of the said convention and the principles of justice,
equity, and the laws of nations."
The American commissioners, Mr. Marcy and Mr. Rowan, (and
afterwards :M:r. ~farcy and Mr. Breckenridge,) allowed interest (at the
same rate as was allowed by the Florida judges in their decrees) in all
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cases of injuries arising from loss or destruction of property; and the
u~pire, Baron Roenne, allowed the interest, in all cases.
Indeed, it
is not understood that the Mexican commissioners objected to such
allowance.
I append to this opinion one other paper, which contains an opinion
of the Attorney General of the United States on a private claim. It
is the case of Mrs. O'Sullivan, and may be found at page 1115 of the
opinions of the Attorneys General.
The rule of damages, adopted by the courts in Florida, was laid
down by tT udge Reid, in the first decision awarding interest, in these
words, viz:
"I am required by the statute to receive, examine, and adJudge these
claims for losses. In performing this duty I have allowed, because it
seemed to me just and equitable to allow it, interest upon the amount
or value of property ascertained to have been lost. The rate of interest
existing in the province at that time (1812 ancl1813) was five per cent.,
and this is the sum allowed in all cases. I am sensible that this allowance will swell considerably the amount to be paid to the claimants,
but I do not perceive how it could be avoided. If we lose sight of the
national character of one of the parties, and suppose two private persons engaged in a dispute about an injury to property, the tribunal to
which resort is had, in adjusting the damages due by the one to the
other, will consider the value of the property destroyed, in connection
with the time for which the owner has been deprived of the use and
enjoyment of his property. The first being ascertained in money, a .
compensation for the last may best be regulated by reverting to the
rate of interest allowed by the law of the country where the wrong
was done."
If the opinions which I have expressed, and attempted to support,
are sound and well founded, then this rule, adopted by the courts, is
exactly the rule which they were bound to adopt, and the only rule
which they could adopt, without manifest disregard of the principles
of public law.
It may, probably, be thought, that some of the opinions which I
have expressed in this paper are more or less in conflict with opinions
which have been given, in these cases, by recent Attorneys General of
the United States, Mr. Crittenden, Mr. Legare, and Mr. Nelson. Perhaps, however, the differences maybe rather apparent than real, as the
questions appear to have been submitted, and their opinions given,
without particular reference to the terms of the treaty, or those authorities of public law which, in my judgment, rule the case. On the
whole, I am prepared to answer the questions proposed to me; and my
opinion clearly is:
I. That the provisions of the treaty require the losses or injuries for
which satisfaction is provided, to be established judicially; and that
the decrees of the judges as to the amount or extent of said losses or
injuries, as to cases within the treaty, are final.
II. That the measure or rule of satisfaction adopted and applied by
the judges in these cases, namely, to add to the value of the property
at the time of its loss, interest, as a compensation for the loss or deprivation of its use, or as covering the necessary and immediate conseRep. No. 93--3
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quences of the original injury, is in accordance with the laws and
usages of nations, and ought, undoubtedly, to be allowed and paid by
the Secretary of the Treasury, under the acts of Congress already
cited.

DANIEL WEBS'rER.
APRIL

6, 1849.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from the rerrtad(,s of the American Commissioner, llfr. Langdon
Cheves) Tejerred to on page 24, of the foregoing.

In his opening paper, under date of February 25, 1825, he states
the rule of indemnification or satisfaction for injuries suffered thus:
''The property of which he (the claimant) claims the equivalent,
belonged to him. It has been decided that it ought not to have been
taken from him; it has been proved that it was taken from him as far
back as the 17th February, 1815, and it has been agreed that he is to
be compensated for the injury he sustained.
"The injury is the cause and the measure of his compensation. The
only inquiry then is, the extent of that injury. The extent of the
injury is equivalent to the pecuniary value of the property at the time
he was deprived of it, and the value of the sum of money of which he
was deprived during the period of its detention."
Again, he says: "Indemnification means a reimbursement of a loss
sustained. If the property taken away on the 17th February, 1815,
were returned now, uninjured, it would not reimburse the loss sustained by the taking away and consequent detention-it would not be
an indemnification. The claimant would still be unindemnifiecl for
the loss of the ~tse of his property for the ten years, which, considered
as money, is nearly equivalent to the original value of the principal
thing. So, in substituting a pecuniary value for the thing, unless
interest is allowed for the use of the money, the claimant will remain
uninclemnifiecl.''
Again, in the same paper: "He who deprives another of the use of
his property does him as great an injustice, in principal if not in
degree, as he who deprives him finally and forever of it, and justice
equally requires that he should indemnify him for the loss of its use as
for the loss of the principal thing. Unless it can be truly averred that
one may deprive another of the ~tse of his property for a given time,.
and if he finally return it uninjured in its inclentity, not be bound in
justice to compensate him for the loss of its ~tse, it is conceived it cannot be truly asserted that interest does not follow the principal.''
Again: ''If interest be an incident usually attendant on the delay
of payment of debts, damages are equally an incident attending on the.
withholding an article of property; and where they are rendered in the
shape of damages, they are usually given with a liberal and sometimes
an unsparing hand. It is, then, a mitigation of the usual incident of
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damages for the detention of property, to establish a fixed and equitable rate of interest as the equivalent.''
"There is no doubt that this is the leading reason why boards of
commissioners, sitting as the representatives of nations, have so
generally made interest the rule of damages, instead of a capricious
discretion, which would, perhaps, often become an unjust and vindictive assessment of them.''
Again: "The claim is not of interest eo nom,ine. It is adopted as a
mitigated rule of damages, compensation, or indemnification, founded
on the estimated pecuniary value of the article withheld. In that case,
the common law and the civil law are both clear in allowing reparation
of the loss of the use of the thing withheld, from the commencement of
the tortious detention. The rule of the public law is the same."

Case of Mrs. 0' Sullivan, and opinion of Attorney General, referred to
on page 25, of the foregoing.

This was a claim growing out of the seizure of a ship and cargo by
a political agent of the United States.
Congress passed an act providing ''that the Secretary of the Treasury
be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to cause the claim of
Mary O'Sullivan, widow and executrix of John O'Sullivan, deceased,
to be examined by the accounting officers of the treasury; and that
there be allowed and paid to the said Mary O'Sullivan, out of any
money, &c., the amount of the actual loss which may be showri, to the
satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury, to have been sustained by
the said John O'Sullivan, in consequence of the act of the late John
M. Forbes, commercial and political agent of the United States of
America) at Buenos Ayres, in detaining the vessel of the said John
O'Sullivan, in the year 1823, and causing her to be sent to the United
States."
This act required payment of the amount of the "actual loss" as
shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury. The case
was referred to the Attorney General Butler, as to the proper rules to be
adopted in ascertaining "the actual loss," and whether the claimant
"was entitled, within the terms and intention of the act, to compensation for the deprivation of the use of the vessel during her detention?''
And, "whether that was not a constructive and consequential, and not
an act1ta l loss ?' '
Mr. Butler, after an elaborate examination of the authorities, deduced
a rule from the decisions of the federal courts, where interest upon the
original value, by way of damages for the loss of the use, in addition
to such original value, had been allowed as the measure of the actual
loss; in every one of which cases he says, ''Congress passed acts indemnifying the officer to the full extent of the recovery against him,"
citing "Laws U. S., 4 vol. p. 91; 3 vol. 369; 6 vol. 282; 7 vol. 259."
"The adjudged cases," he says, "in which recoveries have been had
against officers acting in good faith, and in which Congress afterwards
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made provision for indemnifying the officer, may, therefore, with great
propriety, be referred to, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner
in which the rule is carried into effect.''
He further says: "I cannot agree that the loss of the ~tse of the
vessel was merely a consequential loss; still less than it was constructive
and not actual. It appears to me, that the loss of the beneficial use of
the vessel, was the direct and immediate effect of the interference of
Mr. Forbes. But even if this is to be regarded as a consequential loss,
it will not, therefore, follow that it is not an actual loss, in strict propriety of language, and within the meaning of the law. A loss may
be actual, positive, and real, and may be traced with certainty to a
particular cause. The distinction between immediate and consequential
damages is a familiar one in commercial law; it is the foundation of
the distinction between the action of trespass, and that of trespass on
the case; the former of these actions being brought where the damage
is immediate, and the latter where it is only consequential.
"In each case, however, actual damage is the subject of the suit, and
must be proved to sustain it.''
Mr. Butler concludes that, "it is obvious that the difference in the
value of the vessel is not the whole loss sustained; the beneficial use of
the vessel is also lost to the party during the whole period of the detention; and for this loss, interest on the prime value is but the lowest
rate of indemnification.''

